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Peggy Thompson, ed. Beyond Sense and Sensibility: Moral Formation and the Literary
Imagination from Johnson to Wordsworth. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2015. Xv
+ 214 pp. Index. ISBN: 978-1-61148-640-7.
Reviewed by Elizabeth A. Dolan, Ph.D.
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA
Originally conceived by Samuel Johnson scholar O M Brack, Jr., this collection of essays on
“moral formation and the literary imagination” is edited by Peggy Thompson with a forward in
memoriam of Brack written by Timothy Erwin. Brack is also honored with a photograph taken
on his 65th birthday. As Thompson explains in the introduction, Brack sought to explore what he
saw as the two major eighteenth-century understandings of how the moral subject is formed—
through reason and sensibility. Thus, the collection builds upon a rich and wide-ranging body of
scholarship on sensibility, including studies of the relationship of sensibility to cultural practices
(G. J. Barker-Benfield), to sociability (John Mullan), to race (Markman Ellis), to literary style
(Barbara M. Benedict), to gender (Claudia L. Johnson), to education (Richard A. Barney, Alan
Richardson), and even to things (Lynn Festa). As the title suggests, the collection moves
“beyond” sensibility and reason to examine additional or alternate factors shaping the moral
subject, including social action, habit, and “insensibly” building feelings.
Drawing on a variety of genres, including poetry, literary criticism, novels, children’s literature,
and history, the volume is organized into three sections. The first offers essays that reexamine
the literature of sensibility; the articles in the second section address didactic literature’s
relationship to sense and feeling, and the final three contributions examine moral formation in
light of twenty-first-century theoretical challenges to the Enlightenment formulation of the
subject. In addition to these elements, the volume contains three images—a photograph, an
illustration and a chart.
The first section reassesses the limits of sensibility in works by James Boswell, Robert
Fergusson, and Frances Burney. Adam Rounce considers the ways in which Boswell’s selfstyling as a man of sensibility affected his rarely considered role as a literary critic. Examining
Boswell’s comments on works by Charles Churchill, William Hamilton, William Mason, and
Edward Young, Rounce finds that Boswell exudes more enthusiasm than discrimination in his
literary criticism, and a clearer commitment to the fame of his favorite authors than to the quality
of their work. Although Rounce situates Boswell’s criticism among that of other critics, his
comparisons of Boswell to Samuel Johnson are the most telling. Rather than disagreeing with the
details of Johnson’s assessments of contemporary poets, for example, Boswell attributes his and
Johnson’s differences of opinion to their differing temperaments; in short, according to Boswell,
Johnson lacks his depth of feeling and capacity to be moved. Thus Boswell’s literary criticism
gushes and generalizes, revealing sensibility as a limited lens for literary discrimination.
Rounce’s depiction of the limitations of this feeling-based criticism culminates in a discussion of
Boswell’s tone-deaf No Abolition of Slavery, or the Universal Empire of Love, a striking
example of the misjudgment engendered by the assumption of shared feeling intrinsic to
sensibility.
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With an examination of Fergusson’s poems about animals, Rhona Brown situates the Scottish
poet’s attitude toward sensibility among that of Henry Mackenzie, Laurence Sterne, Anna
Laetitia Barbauld, and Robert Burns. Brown refines the commonly held view of Fergusson as a
dedicated opponent to the literature of sensibility. She concedes that Fergusson’s parody of
Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling in his poem “The Sow of Feeling” offers evidence for the
poet’s criticism of the excesses of sentiment. However, Fergusson’s “Ode to the Gowdspink,” a
poem about a caged goldfinch, sympathetically compares the creature’s plight to that of slaves,
and thus resonates with depictions of captured animals in Barbauld’s “The Mouse’s Petition,”
and in Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey. If Mackenzie’s Harley demonstrates his ability to feel
with human sufferers, Fergusson’s narrator, Barbauld’s narrator, and Sterne’s Yorick exhibit the
capacity to sympathize with animals and people. Concluding the essay, Brown argues for
Fergusson’s influence on Burns. Brown notes that Burns’s poems extend expressions of
compassion from the human and animal to the plant world, but share with Fergusson’s poetry a
turn to moralizing.
While the first two essays reveal Boswell’s ineffective application of sensibility to literary
criticism, and Fergusson’s unexpected deployment of some tenants of sensibility, Heather King’s
essay traces changes in the depiction of women’s performances of sensibility across Frances
Burney’s novels. King notes the disjunction between the frontispiece of Evelina (reprinted in this
volume), in which Evelina kneels at her father’s feet, apparently shaping his moral responses
with her beauty, and the text, which emphasizes Evelina’s suffering. King argues, “sentimental
constructions of women’s morally influential beauty and virtue are built implicitly on women’s
suffering” (46). King argues that the disjunction between Evelina’s beauty and her suffering,
which creates discomfort in the reader, marks the beginning of Burney’s rejection of sensibility.
While Burney’s Cecilia presents readers with typical sentimental tableaux, Cecilia’s extreme
suffering in these depictions undercuts any moral lesson for the reader. Burney’s Camilla
removes the common scene of a suffering woman being observed by people of sensibility,
inviting the reader to look “directly at Camilla” and see not her, but “what she sees” (47). King
argues persuasively that this diversion of the reader’s gaze gives Camilla the room to reflect
internally about her actions. Across the three novels, King argues, Burney highlights the
destructive emphasis on women’s “somatic eloquence” or visible virtue, suggesting as a
replacement a focus on the heroine’s “virtuous, self-regarding vision” (48, 59). This fine essay is
drawn from a larger, forthcoming project on the visibility of women’s virtue in the late
eighteenth century.
The middle section of the volume takes up didacticism in the sermon, biography, novel, and
children’s book. Christopher D. Johnson argues that the nonconformist minister Philip
Doddridge appeals to readers’ rational capabilities and capacity for feeling in his popular Life of
Colonel James Gardiner. Doddridge explores the “intersections and interdependence of reason
and faith,” while simultaneously making “overt appeals to emotion” that “connect Doddridge’s
work to sentimental literature” (65, 70). Like other dissenting ministers, Doddridge
recommended that his congregation rely on rational evidence to support their faith, and both his
evidence-based biographical method and his depictions of Gardiner’s own reasonableness
support this perspective. However, drawing also on the language of sentiment in the biography,
Doddridge risks miring readers in the sentimental emotions of the moment of suffering, and thus
undermining the teleological conversion story in which suffering is always redeemed in heaven.
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To avoid this pitfall of sensibility, Johnson argues, Doddridge shows Gardiner “suffering, but not
complaining,” displaces pathos onto tangentially related narratives in which figures other than
Gardiner suffer, and incorporates emotive hymns into the biography at key moments to allow for
an emotional reinforcement of the more rational didactic moral lesson (73). Johnson’s essay
challenges scholars’ assessment of dissenting religious beliefs as more engaged with rationality
than with sentiment, and the idea that sensibility originates in secular moral philosophy and more
“emotionally excessive branches of Christianity” (72). Instead, he reveals Dissenting Christianity
as an important precursor to literary sensibility.
In her essay “Two Singularly Moral Works,” Leslie A. Chilton argues for the influence of
François Fénelon’s Les aventures de Télémaque on Tobias Smollett’s The Expedition of
Humphry Clinker. Smollett translated Fénelon’s didactic romance shortly before writing his final
novel (and Chilton co-edited this translation with O M Brack). Chilton argues that Smollett’s
novel was influenced by Fénelon’s criticism of the desire for luxury as disruptive to social order.
Both Fénelon and Smollett supported a rigid class system that would encourage moral behavior
and thus contribute to the stability of society. Chilton regards the translation, The Adventures of
Telemachus, The Son of Ulysses, to be an important resource for understanding the origins of the
turn to moral education in England. As someone who works on Romantic-era children’s
literature, I found the explication of Fénelon’s pedagogy informative. The essay focuses
exclusively on “moral formation,” thus fulfilling the volume’s promise to move “Beyond Sense
and Sensibility.”
The essay that follows, “The Politically Engaged Child,” by Adrianne Wadewitz, demonstrates
Charlotte Smith’s commitment to the development of both sense and sensibility in children, an
account that resonates with Johnson’s discussion of Doddridge’s religious rhetoric based in
reason and feeling. Focusing primarily on Smith’s children’s books Rural Walks and
Conversations Introducing Poetry, Wadewitz argues persuasively, “Smith saw a place for
children in the public sphere founded on the discourse of sensibility” (91). Wadewitz suggests
that “late eighteenth-century children’s writers like Smith created a new version of sensibility,”
which emphasized empathy and social action rather than moral goodness demonstrated through
tears (91). Moving beyond Rousseau’s assertion that children learn better from experiences than
from books, Smith posits that to mature in a healthy way, “children must not only experience the
world but also construct a narrative about that world that incorporates the poetry of sensibility”
(100-101). Wadewitz concludes with a compelling argument for the revolutionary status of
Smith’s commitment to children’s political agency. ABO readers will appreciate the resonance
between Wadewitz’s essay on Smith and King’s essay on Burney, both of which depict the
writers as exploring alternatives to the pitfalls of the physical manifestations of sensibility for
women and children. Reading this excellent chapter, one regrets the recent loss of this fine
scholar.
The essays in the third section of the volume bring eighteenth-century theories of moral
formation into conversation with more recent research in social psychology, affect theory, and
object-relations theory. In her essay “Habit and Reason in Samuel Johnson’s Rambler,” Peggy
Thompson asserts that Johnson was as concerned about actions based on habit as those based on
feeling, because both are non-rational. Habit can derail the exercise of reason, which depends
upon our ability to see future rewards, reflect on past experience, and flex our will. In addition to
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Johnson’s explicit, if understudied, warnings about the dangers of habit, Thompson finds that
Johnson also endorses the potential for intellectual habits to promote virtue. In these moments,
Johnson’s moral psychology resonates with John Dewey’s assertion that we are our habits, or
Bill Pollard’s and Nancy E. Snow’s reconciliation of habit with reason and virtue. In this sense,
“the Rambler essays seem to shift between an Enlightenment image of humanity as defined and
governed by rational choice, on the one hand, and a postmodern acknowledgement of habit’s
powerful constitutive force, on the other” (123). The essay offers a rich understanding of the
tensions within Johnson’s thought about moral formation.
James Noggle’s fascinating essay, “Unfelt Affect,” brings attention to the adverb “insensibly,”
which, according to Google’s Ngram Viewer, enters printed texts around 1690, peaks in 1786,
and declines consistently through the nineteenth century. Noggle provides a helpful chart to
demonstrate the rise and fall of “insensibility” before moving into a discussion of the usage of
the word in Eliza Haywood’s The Female Spectator, Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments,
and Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall and Memoirs. While the verb “insensible” suggests a
blockage of feeling, an opposition to sensibility, the adverbial form is closer in meaning to
“unnoticed.” Although decidedly un-theorized, especially in comparison to “sensibility,” the
word “insensibly” “makes certain transactions in [the discourse of sensibility] possible” (126).
“Insensibly” refers to “time’s opacity”,” to the gradual approach of feeling, even to “an unfeeling
built into the way time unfolds” (143). In this regard it resonates with recent definitions of affect
by Brian Massumi, Gregory J. Seigworth, and others as “visceral forces beneath, alongside, or
generally other than conscious knowing . . . that can . . . drive us toward movement, thought and
extension” (133). Beginning with close attention to a single word, this thought-provoking essay
significantly expands our sense of how the eighteenth-century self was thought to be shaped by
both conscious and unconscious feeling.
With his “Seeing into the Life of Things: Re-viewing Early Wordsworth through ObjectOriented Philosophy,” Evan Gottlieb charts evidence of Wordsworth’s interest in “the move
from empiricism to early psychologism adumbrated by the figures of Locke, Hume, and Hartley”
and in Kant’s anthropocentric turn (151). Gottlieb argues convincingly that in his treatment of
objects in his early poetry, including “Tintern Abbey,” Wordsworth anticipates object-relations
theorists, especially Graham Harman, who argues that no sensory account of an object will
exhaust its reality. This perspective significantly differentiates Wordsworth from eighteenthcentury empiricists and idealists. Wordsworth, Gottlieb asserts, “represents the way all objects
withdraw from human knowledge, but also captures some sense of the way objects withdraw
from each other too” (157). In addition to being the most philosophically invested, this essay
offers the most groundbreaking reading of a canonical author.
Although Thompson notes that the volume seeks to challenge Sidney’s assertion that “literature
is not philosophical” (2-3), and instead recognizes “the mutually constitutive relationship
between poetics and ethics, between literary forms and moral norms” (3), the final essay is the
only one to engage eighteenth-century philosophical thought in depth. Readers seeking a more
detailed investigation of the connection between literary and philosophical accounts of sympathy
and sensibility might consult Nancy Yousef’s Romantic Intimacy (2013). However, those
looking for varied and exciting ideas about theories of moral formation in the eighteenth century,
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including but also moving beyond theories of sensibility and rationality, will find much to enjoy
in this volume.
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